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Abstract:  This paper seeks to define and compare Brazilian national development strategies 
during the Cardoso and Lula administrations. Assuming a political economy perspective, we first 
provide a context for understanding contemporary Brazilian development by defining the 
developmental state characterizing Brazilian governance from 1930 to 1985, followed by an 
overview of the theoretical arguments underlying the reform process. Using an historical 
deductive methodology, we explore the national development strategies of the two 
administrations through a narrative of their divergent agendas and the economic and social 
policies they engendered. Finally, we consider the similarities and distinctions between 
development policies occurring in the periods under analysis, drawing attention to the evolving 
character and role of a reformed, but still intact, developmental state in Brazil.  
Introduction 
The beginning of the 21st century marked an apparent change in Latin American politics. 
Brazil, like many of its neighbors, elected a leader that seemed to represent a decisive turn away 
from the “neoliberal” agenda that characterized policy-making in the 1990s. Upon taking office, 
however, this new, leftist president—Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (Lula)—maintained the economic 
model of his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC). In spite of president Lula’s 
apparent failure to install a new economic model, his presidency has produced marked advances 
in the area of social welfare policy, restoring much of the progressive credit granted him by his 
history as union organizer and Worker Party(PT) leader. Much of this success, however, rests on 
the policies enacted during the FHC presidencies—a fact which suggests that, in Brazil, the 
famous “turn to the left” may not have occurred. Certainly, as Molyneux (2008) suggests, the 
paradoxical links between an administration focused on state reform (FHC), and one which 
 ostensibly serves as a bastion for progressive policy-making, warrants a more nuanced and 
historically grounded inquiry. 
 Understanding the relationship between policies made during the FHC and Lula 
administrations hinges on a comprehension of Brazil’s distinct brand of developmentalism. 
While much analysis has been made of the political and ideological factors involved in 
contemporary policy-making, this has often lacked an appropriate consideration of the historical 
and institutional factors providing the context. Simply put, economic and social policies cannot 
be considered only in the context of the most influential ideas of the time; they must also be 
considered in the context of their overall intent; their function in the overall plan. In the case of 
Brazil, contemporary policy-making must be viewed in light of the government’s longstanding 
and explicit role in guiding national development. Thus, in order to understand the comparative 
experiences of the FHC and Lula periods, one must focus less on the differ from each other, and 
more on how they work in connection with each other as part of a new stage in national 
development. While both internal and international factors have brought on profound change to 
economic, political, and social realities, these have only sparked the continual evolution of a 
development strategy with a strong role for government. 
The Old Developmentalism 
The Brazilian developmental state began in 1930, with the revolution that put Gétulio 
Vargas in power. The 1930 revolution laid to rest the Old Republic, a period when a powerful 
landed aristocracy governed Brazil in oligarchic fashion, with governors of states like São Paulo 
and Minas Gerais wielding great national power1. Vargas assumed the presidency with an 
explicit agenda for modernizing Brazilian society. This modernizing vision sought to develop a 
                                                 
1 For a detailed overview of Vargas’ rise to power and enigmatic political style see Bak (1983). 
 national industrial base through alliances with the nascent Brazilian capitalist and commercial 
classes. The implementation of this vision initiated the beginning of a state-led development 
model, culminating in 1937 with the Estado Novo (New State), a dictatorial regime making use 
of every type of intervention, including political repression. Two dimensions of the modernizing 
government model established under the Vargas regime register as particularly relevant. First, 
the state became the primary agent of development. Its role in the economy went far beyond 
stimulating supply and demand; the new government provided a vision for the economy and 
pursued it aggressively. Second, this model of government sought to reorganize and control 
society through installing an authoritarian corporatist model of state-society relations. In other 
words, the state assumed a pivotal role in both economic and social development, a role that both 
coincided with, and provided rationale for a new centralized power structure. 
Breaking from the decentralized, federalist structure of the Old Republic, the Vargas 
regime established a strong, interventionist central government. In contrast to the Café com 
Leite2 order of the past, the Vargas regime operated with a clear bias toward industrial urban 
sectors, creating new modes of intervention, consolidated in a central government. This strong 
central government regulated and invested directly in productive sectors, in a mode of economic 
intervention that came to be known as import substitution industrialization (ISI). Utilizing 
subsidies, protective tariffs, and direct investment the government actively promoted an 
industrial revolution (Pereira, 2009). State agencies were erected in order to regulate vital sectors 
of the economy, such as water, power, steel, coffee, and sugar. The state even assumed a role as 
producer, financing a large state-owned steel company through the U.S. Eximbank. In order to 
operate the new interventionist state and reorganize society in a modern, controlled fashion, 
                                                 
2 Café com Leite refers to the political dominance of the governors of São Paulo (representative 
of coffee producers) and Minas Gerais (representative of its dairy industry). 
 Vargas reorganized the channels of governance and representation, contributing to the other 
major legacy of the Vargas era: a corporate institutional framework. 
The push to modernize Brazil’s society and economy leaned heavily upon a revolution in 
the mode of political representation. In harmony with the bias toward urban, industrial classes, 
the Vargas regime imposed a corporate model of representation. With industrialist and military 
support of a state-led modernization, the Vargas regime initiated a restructuring of unions as the 
primary channel for working class representation. This process of societal reorganization utilized 
repressive and propagandist means, disciplining politicians, union leaders, and anyone else that 
posed a threat to the vision of the Estado Novo. Two major institutional characteristics emerged 
from this process. First, the development state emerged in the context of a coalition between the 
federal government, the nascent national industrial bourgeoisie, and the working class; this 
alliance would later come to clash with the centralized, modernist state’s tendency toward 
coercive means. Given this structure, interest groups could only influence government policy 
through state regulated channels, providing the power elite with further insulation from the 
working class. Second, society’s new order and economic revolution came at the hands of an 
authoritarian, quasi-fascist government. The more government institutions were used to impose 
order in economic and social arenas, the easier it became for the apparatuses of power to be 
exercised in more untenable ways. 
With the Vargas dictatorship overthrown in 1945 by military coup, the intervening and 
corporate characteristics of the government carried over into a period of fragile democratic rule. 
The shift in politics brought with it a new constitution in 1946, which reflected the desire of 
many to move away from the centralized power structure of the preceding personal dictatorship. 
Yet the process of nation building resumed, creating an obstacle for decentralization. After a 
 conservative period of governing, characterized by repression of labor movements, unions, and 
leftist politics, Vargas was re-elected with a more populist agenda. During this period, the 
government assumed a more pro-labor and nationalist position, increasing the minimum wage 
and shunning foreign capital. Major institutions were erected: the National Economic 
Development Bank (BNDE), Electrobrás (the state electricity producer and provider), and 
Petrobrás (the state petroleum company), bringing with them an expansion of state investment in 
infrastructure and productive sectors.  
After a dramatic end to the Vargas presidency, Juscelino Kubitschek took office, carrying 
on the tradition of a now populist, centralized development state. Kubitschek implemented the 
most coherent industrialization program to date, which greatly expanded the federal 
government’s role in investment. Moreover, the Kubitschek government added a new, 
controversial dynamic to the nation’s development process: the promotion of foreign capital. 
Though successful in terms of industrial development and growth, the Kubitschek government 
spent beyond its means, resulting in inflationary pressure and the beginnings of an institutional 
crisis. Growing disapproval from military factions soon ushered to an end the period of a 
democratically deliberated economic development policy. The tension between the 
developmental state’s tendency to control society finally and its role as driver of the economy 
became too great. 
The coup of 1964 resulted in a twenty-one year span of military rule. An alliance between 
the military elite and technocrats characterized the governing style of the dictatorship. Political 
dissenters experienced a violent purge. Economically, orthodox measures were taken to curb 
inflation and reduce the spending deficit. Real wages were depressed, protectionist policies were 
slightly relaxed, and subsidized credit was reduced. Prices of publicly produced goods and 
 services were raised, in order to reduce effective subsidies, and, without domestic credit, 
Brazilian businesses were purchased by foreign, especially American, firms. This initiated the 
trifecta of national, international, and state-owned enterprises that would dominate the Brazilian 
economy until the 1990s. Though monetarist approaches to economic stability were 
implemented, the basic nature of state intervention and ownership persisted. Eventually, the lack 
of political legitimacy for the military dictatorship gained momentum in the milieu of economic 
turmoil set on by an external debt crisis. In this context, governance in Brazil became open to 
institutional reform, with various theoretical paradigms calling for reforms based on  principles. 
 The turmoil of the 80s brought Brazil under the pressure of an external debt crisis and an 
internal crisis of government legitimacy. Having been dominated by a military dictatorship for 
two decades, the call for democracy emerged even stronger in the face of the authoritarian 
regime’s inability to manage the crisis. On a fundamental level, the break from authoritarianism 
to democratic rule altered a cornerstone of the model of governance set up during the Vargas 
regime: statism. While the establishment of an effective democracy is an arduous and 
multifarious process, the return of civil rule to Brazil also brought a return to decentralization 
and a period of institutional instability ripe for state reform. While this brought change to an 
increasingly illegitimate political framework, it also exposed the separate, but related,  role of the 
State as an economic and social agent. 
Underlying Theories of Development and Governance 
 Development economics provided theoretical support for the modernizing, interventionist 
state. In basic terms, this paradigm of economic analysis focused on the need for government 
intervention to correct undesirable market outcomes (Fishlow, 1990). A major premise of 
development economics insisted that less-developed countries operate under distinct conditions 
 than those in advanced countries. Countering the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, 
Raul Prebisch argued that the relative backwardness and lack of economic development 
characterizing countries of the “periphery”, should be attributed to the disequilibria inherent in 
the international market system, a structure confined to the power relations produced by the 
course of history. Prebisch identified a relationship of dependency in trade between periphery 
and core countries, with countries of the periphery, those producing primary commodities, at 
constantly declining terms of trade with core countries—or, those countries exporting industrial 
goods3. This insight spawned new approaches to economic analysis4 and, more importantly, 
implied that government intervention was needed to correct the asymmetrical relationships 
resultant from historical processes, in internal markets as in external. 
 The structuralist paradigm postulates that structural rigidities in society prevent the 
market mechanism from functioning in the manner theorized by classical economists. 
Inconsistent growth, undesirable income distribution, disequilibria and an insufficient savings 
rate are all attributed to market failure. Consequently, government policy should aim to correct 
market failure, provide public goods, and ensure the proper rate of savings. Given the relative 
underdevelopment of peripheral countries5, government-led industrialization seemed an 
appropriate solution to overcoming historically derived obstacles. This approach proposed 
import substitution through state-led industrialization(ISI). The ISI approach advocated trade 
protectionism to protect infant industries, direct government involvement in developing 
                                                 
3 This seminal contribution is generally referred to as the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis, due to the 
coincidence of the two authors arriving independently at very similar conclusions, at more or less 
the same time. See Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1949). 
4 Both the dependency theorists and structuralist schools can be traced back to this important 
assertion within the field of development economics.  
5 The historical reasons for Brazil’s underdevelopment can be found in the classic work by Celso 
Furtado, Formação Econômico do Brasil (1959). 
 industrial sectors, social welfare though societal modernization, and price controls through 
regulation and government planning. 
In the 1930s, classical economic analysis lost sway in Latin America, as it did in the 
advanced countries. With the Keynesian revolution and development economics on the upswing, 
heterodox economics dominated policy making, bringing forth the Welfare State in the 
industrialized countries and the Development State in many of the non-industrialized countries. 
With the crisis of the 1970s came a renewal of the classical economic paradigm: an ideological 
shift known broadly as neoliberalism. In the developing world, the lack of price stability and the 
pressing constraints of a growing debt crisis led analysts to begin critiquing theories that 
supported the role of the state in development. As a counterpoint to the heterodox assertion that 
market failure necessitates government intervention, neoliberal theorists responded that 
government too can produce failures, with possibly higher costs than those of the untouched 
market. 
In essence, neoliberal economists object to the policy response of developmental 
economics. Deepak Lal (1983) provides four areas of debate between orthodoxy and, what he 
terms, the Dirigiste Dogma. He asserts that, in reviewing the history of interventionist policies, 
(i) supplanting the market mechanism often creates more distortions and disequilibria greater 
than those that would otherwise occur, (ii) the focus on macroeconomic policy design overlooks 
microeconomic exchanges, to the neglect of social welfare, (iii) free trade is the “hand-maiden of 
growth”, making protectionist trade policies unnecessary and often debilitating growth because 
of their escalating costs, (iv) government intervention for the purpose of  equitable income 
distribution largely rests upon controversial ethical argument. Fundamentally, the argument 
against developmental economics claims that in every case—trade, income distribution, 
 industrial development, etc.—a comparison of the resource and distortion costs of intervention to 
non-intervention results in the assertion that "imperfect markets are superior to imperfect 
planning" (Lal, 1983, p 106).6 
The failure of the ISI development model, and the gaining influence of neoliberal policy-
making left structuralism in a period of transition. Analysts identified areas of failure: 1) 
exchange-rate overvaluation discriminated against exports, contributing to the growing 
imbalance of the external account, 2) government expenditures grew faster than revenues, and 3) 
the focus on industrialization led to distorted development, with sectoral imbalances between 
agriculture and industry and an insufficient rate of labor absorption in industry (Leiva, 2008). 
Furthermore, the paradigmatic shift toward the neoclassical school of economics on the 
international level presented Latin America’s development economists, primarily represented in 
Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), to address theoretical 
deficiencies in addressing short-term issues. As this view on policy-making came under 
evaluation, institutional reforms seemed a necessary step in the journey to re-encounter a path 
toward development.  
 The neostructuralist model of development takes into account the changing context for 
policy-making, but maintains that the government should pursue an active strategy of 
development. The ECLAC offers a summary of the neostructuralist approach to addressing the 
problems presented to the development process in Latin America7. Recognizing the lopsided 
development of industry, resultant from the heavy bias toward internal markets, the authors 
envisaged a modernization of the productive structure. In this view, the already existent 
                                                 
6 For an additional argument advocating for the retraction of state intervention based on total cost 
comparison see Krueger (1991). 
7 See Sunkel, O. and  Zuleta, G. (1990) 
 industrial base, a manifest success of ISI, should compete in the export market and develop a 
dynamic comparative advantage, supported by government subsidies rather than protective trade 
barriers. Governments should also encourage an atmosphere conducive to technological learning 
and innovation. A major deficiency of past development strategies lay in the dependence on 
foreign technology; hence, a major element of the new development strategy should be to create 
and strengthen a system of innovation and technology sharing within countries. In addition, the 
ECLAC admonishes governments to create a macroeconomic environment stable enough for 
long-term capital accumulation, which should be invested in innovation and productive 
capability. Finally, in assessing the crisis facing Latin American governments, neostructuralist 
theorists recommend a renovation of the state. The state should use economic incentives and 
relative prices to engender a strategic vision for development, backed by a coalition of key social 
and political groups. 
FHC-A Reformist’s Agenda 
 Riding the wave of support from the success of the real plan, Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso began his first term with an ambitious reform agenda, primarily targeting financial 
stability. Though Cardoso’s party, the PSDB, had opposed the drastic reforms of the Collor 
government, the growing influence of financial technicians within the party, the state’s chronic 
fiscal crises—now exposed without the masking effect of inflation—and the dynamics of the 
party’s political coalition with the PFL, a center-right party, led to the embrace of structural 
reforms (Power, 2001). Many of the reforms aimed at remedying some of the more questionable 
components of the 1988 constitution; but, on a more fundamental level, the reforms constituted 
an attempt to redefine the role of the state, especially in its functions as an agent of development. 
 Shortly after assuming the presidency, the executive office released a document 
describing the crises facing the country as one of the state, resultant from past government 
policies and institutions. The structural issues facing Brazil, it was argued, required a new 
development strategy with a new—less dominant—role for government. This document, the 
Plano Diretor da Reforma do Aparelho do Estado (1995), called for administrative reforms, 
reductions in state protections, the break up of state monopolies, restructuring the social security 
system, and a more balanced budget. At the center of all of these reform agendas lay a focus on 
fiscal and monetary policies—corruption and mismanagement in these areas having contributed 
to the unsustainability of the old development model. With the containment of inflation having 
provided the administration with a majority of its political capital, it may be noted that nearly all 
the reforms pursued during the period seemed to hinge on the stability plan that helped bring 
FHC to power: the real plan.  
The impetus for these reforms stemmed from arguments for a more efficient and effective 
state, yet reforms of this nature also found support in the principles underlying the Washington 
Consensus—a call for the virtual removal of the state from market activity in order to let flourish 
the market’s superior efficiency. As a result, the fundamentally reformist agenda of the Cardoso 
administration is difficult to characterize, with an internationally influential ideology 
recommending a reduction of state intervention in a market society (Williamson, 1990) and a 
nationalist-originated call for a redefinition of the state’s role in guiding development (Bresser 
Pereira, 1996), which also called for a redefinition of the government-state relationship. At the 
time, these perspectives clearly coalesced to influence politicians to push for the same reforms, 
but sorting out the degree to which each perspective defined the actual reforms carried out may 
 be necessary to understand the emergent development model and the government’s long term 
role within it.   
Macroeconomic Policy- FHC 
  Having been elected with a mandate to establish economic stability, FHC pursued a 
macroeconomic model with this objective as a clear priority. The real plan served as the 
fundamental component of the government’s promise of stability. This created a strong incentive 
to protect the success of the plan over and against other policy objectives. While the 
administration’s agenda clearly expanded beyond the scope of macroeconomic stability, the 
characteristics and dynamics of the real plan demanded major concessions in other policy 
sectors. The primacy of inflationary management through a quasi-fixed currency regime reduced 
the flexibility of other macroeconomic policies—especially fiscal policy—and created the 
conditions for a self-perpetuating system of indebtedness and systemic un-competitiveness, 
catering to short-term investment flows. During the second FHC administration, the 
shortcomings of the plan were exposed by international financial fluctuations, leading the 
government to allow a floating currency regime and dedicate itself further to programmatic fiscal 
balance. 
 Designed by economists within the PSDB and articulated by Cardoso, the real plan was 
the last of a series of programmatic attempts to bring inflation under control (Power, 2001-2002). 
In contrast to its predecessors, the real plan recognized that price freezes alone would not slow 
inflation to acceptable levels because fiscal profligacy on the part of government contributed to 
inflationary pressure. The plan thus began with a series of measures aimed at bringing a greater 
degree of fiscal management to the central government, reducing revenue transfers to sub-
national governments and freeing portions of the revenue pool to budgetary discretion.  
 Establishing some centralized control of government spending was no easy task. The 
1988 constitution reorganized Brazil’s federalist arrangement, redividing the national tax base to 
increase revenue transfers to subnational governments, but failing to transfer a commensurate 
portion of federal programs to the state and local levels (Affonso and Silva, 1995). 
Consequently, the central government was left with more mandated spending than revenue, 
leading to a chronic deficit, further exacerbated by the clientelistic practices of sub-national 
actors8 (Fleischer, 1998). During the first stage of the real plan, with Itamar Franco in office, in 
order to reign in profligate spending, a constitutional amendment was passed creating the Fundo 
Social de Emergência (FSE). This fund de-linked 20% of a large portion of federal revenues9 
from constitutionally-mandated spending, granting the government the leeway to establish a 
budgetary surplus. Although the FHC reform agenda identified the need for a permanent 
discretionary powers, gathering political support for such an act proved difficult, since sub-
national interests were at stake. Given the complicated nature of support for the measure, the 
FSE emerged as a temporary act, needing re-approval, a characteristic that would provide 
opponents of re-centralization with bargaining power in the reform process (Samuels, 2003). 
With this new control over spending, the central government produced a balanced primary 
budget for 1994, establishing the first component of its stability plan: fiscal austerity. 
The next step in the real plan began in March 1994, with the introduction of an indexed 
currency—the real unit of value (URV). The URV sought to synchronize price readjustment by 
taking into account the average of three price indexes. The conversion of salaries, rents, and 
public tariffs into the URV required adherence to some rules and obligations, while other prices 
                                                 
8 In the transition to democracy, demands for patronage by state and municipal politicians 
amplified, contributing to a pervasive culture of clientelistic relations (Weyland, 1997-1998). 
9 The FSE applied only to shared tax revenues, of which the two largest sources are the Income 
Tax (IR) and the Industrial Products Tax (IPI). For more see, Afonso, J.R. and Serra, J. (2007). 
 were free to use the old currency or the new. In sum, this stage sought to link prices all over the 
economy, equilibrating prices relative to one another while inflation still occurred in the old 
currency.  
Eventually, after four months of this price adjustment process, the URV was transformed 
into the real, which converted at a one-to-one basis to the U.S. dollar. In this way, the plan 
successfully coordinated the synchronization of prices throughout the Brazilian economy and 
tied the stability of those prices to the U.S. dollar10. In other words, domestic price stability in 
Brazil became dependant on external markets, especially in the U.S. The strategy embodied in 
the real plan thus attributes two important characteristics to monetary policy and, as we shall see, 
to development policies in general. First, price stability became tied to the government’s ability 
to maintain the value of the real relative to the dollar, which resulted in the overvaluation of the 
currency and created a greater need by the monetary authorities for foreign currency. Second, as 
a result of the focus on maintaining the value of the currency, the government needed to attract 
vast amounts of foreign investment, putting pressure on domestic interest rates.  
 The maintenance of the quasi-fixed currency regime—the foundation of ongoing price 
stability—required the government to maintain an open financial system and led to a dependency 
on foreign capital (Ferrari-Filho and Paula, 2003). In order to maintain the targeted minimum 
exchange value against the dollar, the government needed a large pool of foreign reserves to 
counteract market forces. The opening of trade and privatization11—meant to increase 
international competitiveness—had short-term degenerative effects on the countries export 
                                                 
10 Conversion to the Real began in July of 1994, with the new currency exchanging at a 1to1 
basis with the U.S. Dollar. It should be noted that, though one of parity, this conversion rate was 
less rigid than the convertibility program adopted in neighboring Argentina. By the end of 1994, 
the Real exchanged at a rate of R$ .85 to US$1. See Macedo (2003). 
11 See section on government role in industrial development 
 capacity, leading to a trade deficit. The legacy of the external debt crisis having made its mark on 
foreign reserves12, the government had no option but to depend on international investors for 
their liquidity needs. Thus the central bank maintained high domestic interest rates to increase 
the attractiveness of investing in Brazil. This resulted in a current account deficit and an 
overvalued currency.  
 The near immediate success of the real plan in reducing and controlling inflation is 
undeniable. Ferrari and Paula (2003) show a sharp division in inflation rates during 1994. The 
first half of the year experienced an accumulated inflation rate of 763%, while the second six 
months exhibited a huge drop in inflation down to 38%, clearly the result of the stabilization 
plan. Yet, in spite of this significant reduction in inflation, Brazilian price levels still rose faster 
than those in the U.S., the new anchor of Brazilian price stability. Given a residual inflation of 
17% (Macedo, 2003), the real experienced further overvaluation in comparison to the dollar. The 
success of reigning in inflation also brought other, more tangible, benefits. Barros (2000), for 
example, shows that absolute poverty levels between the years 1993 and 1995 dropped from 
41.7% to 33.9%, an effect attributed to rise in real incomes that occurs with a decline in inflation 
(Amann and Baer, 2002). Furthermore, the containment of inflation, alongside the central 
government’s increased control of total government revenues, also had the bonus of exposing 
unsustainable government spending13, especially on the sub-national level (Samuels, 2003).   
 With price stability a clear priority, establishing fiscal austerity at all levels of 
government presided as a fundamental objective. Key efforts to putting the brakes on fiscal 
                                                 
12 With dismal growth and a lack of willing foreign investors, Brazil’s foreign reserves collapsed 
in the 80s, resulting in a unilateral moratorium on debt in 1987. 
13 This is referred to as the “reverse Olivera-Tanzi effect”, which argues that because 
government spending is set in nominal prices and taxes indexed to inflation, a hidden public 
deficit is revealed in the absence of excessive inflation. See Bacha (1994). 
 profligacy occurred through legislative channels. As already mentioned, the FSE played a key 
part in reducing government deficit spending to prevent the budgetary disaster looming behind 
the veil of hyper-inflation. However, the FSE required legislative renewal14 and only provided 
the central government with limited discretionary power, rather than erecting strict budgetary 
constraints. In 1995, congress passed the “Camata Law”, which required states to limit their 
payrolls to 60% of net receipts by January of 199915. In addition to this, the refinancing of state 
debts required them to cease issuing bonds and, in 1998, the National Monetary Council 
prohibited sub-national actors from contracting foreign debt (Samuels, 2003). Finally, in 2000, 
the government passed the “Fiscal Responsibility Law”, which set debt limits for all levels of 
government, stopped the central government refinancing of sub-national debts, and sought to 
increase fiscal transparency by requiring governments to publish revenue and expenditures. 
Moreover, it made misuse of public funds a felony crime with severe consequences: a direct 
effort to confront the culture of corruption. 
A restructuring of the national financial system accompanied the drive to establish rules 
for government spending. Bank consolidation, both public and private, played a central part in 
this process.  The Brazilian Central Bank (2006) reports that, especially in the initial stage of the 
Cardoso presidency, the number of state-owned banks decreased dramatically: from 32, in 1995, 
to 15, in 2002. Private banks also decreased in numbers, while also becoming increasingly 
foreign owned.16 The reduction and consolidation of bank ownership came as an effect of the 
                                                 
14 The FSE is not a permanent institutional reform, but a “sunset provision”, requiring re-
approval by congress. Samuels (2003) notes that drumming up political support for this 
reapproval necessitated trade-offs with sub-national actors, mostly in regards to restructuring 
their debt. 
15 Samuels (2003) reports that, previous to this, many sub-national governments maintained 
payrolls amounting to 80-90 percent of total revenue. 
16 Foreign private ownership rose by 20%  
 real plan, at the loss of inflation-generated profits and the exposure of untenable state debts in 
the absence of inflation (Almeida and Jayme Jr., 2008). 
 The consolidation of the financial system received direct support from the central 
government through the Incentive Program for the Restructuring of and Strengthening of the 
National Financial System (PROER) and the Program of Incentives to Reduce the Presence of 
the State Public Sector in Banking Activity (PROES). Consolidation, elimination, and 
privatization of state-owned banks occurred in conjunction with the process of reconciling the 
government budgets at the sub-national level. With state and municipal debts exposed, sub-
national governments had little choice but to negotiate with the central government to refinance 
their debts. In exchange for control over state-banks, the central government absorbed sub-
national debts, contributing to the ironic expansion of debt during an administration with the 
primary objective of combating the  instability caused by a debt crisis. 
Even with the efforts to reign in spending and consolidate the state banking system, a 
budgetary deficit plagued much of the Cardoso period. While a primary surplus of 5.2% was 
reached in 1994, the next four years failed to see even a primary balance.17 Though the struggle 
to institutionalize fiscal austerity played a central role in the political process, a balanced budget 
reappeared only when government revenues increased, and this a result of a rise in the tax rate. 
Given the maintenance of high real interest rates18 to attract foreign investment, interest 
payments on public debt exacerbated government accounting, driving the country into further 
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18 From 1994-2002, the average annual cost of interest payments on public debt as a portion of 
GDP was 9.99%. 
 debt. Samuels(2003) notes that R$109.4 billion of the debt accrued during the Cardoso 
presidency came as the direct result of the high-interest rates characterizing the period.  
The process of bank re-structuring and sub-national debt refinancing contributed greatly 
to the accumulation of internal public debt. According to the Ministerio da Fazenda (2003), 
Brazil’s 1994 internal debt of R$60.7 billion, or 28.1 per cent of GDP, grew by an order of 
magnitude to R$623.2 billion, or 55 per cent of GDP, by the end of 2002. R$297.7 billion of this 
indebtedness came through the restructuring of sub-national accounts. Samuels (2003) finds the 
structure of the internal debt potentially problematic due to the short terms of bond maturity, the 
debt’s ties to the US dollar, and the sizeable portion of debt linked to Brazil’s high interest rate. 
These factors forced Brazil to continuously to rollover debts that further increased public 
exposure to liquidity crises and would amplify the volume of debt in the case of a currency 
depreciation.  
The negative effects of an overvalued real eventually forced the government to abandon 
its quasi-fixed currency regime. With foreign reserves in high demand—in order to finance an 
expanding debt, maintain the value of the currency, and pay for the trade deficit—Brazil’s 
chronic and growing current account deficit left the country exposed to an international crisis. 
The Asian crisis of 1997, followed by the Russian crisis of 1998, brought speculative attacks 
against Brazil. In the midst of a run for re-election, the Cardoso administration responded to the 
attacks with conservative measures, raising interests and cutting spending. However, the 
deterioration of the external capital account19 proved too much. After re-election, the 
government finally acknowledge the overvalued real, allowing the currency to float. The 
devaluation, which many found to be long overdue, further contributed to the expansion of debt, 
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 but also alleviated the stagnation of growth and poor performance of the Brazilian export sector, 
both results of currency overvaluation. However, despite the many issues with macroeconomic 
model, the fixed exchange regime constituted the only element of monetary policy to change. 
While this did provide the possibility for lower interest rates, maintaining high real interest rates 
remained a key strategy to preventing price inflation, reaffirming Brazil’s dependency on foreign 
capital and tying the government in what Samuels (2003) calls a “fiscal straitjacket”. 
Economic Growth and Development 
Following the course set by the Collor de Mello administration, FHC pursued a reform of 
state-economy relations with a less active role for government. In contrast to the traditional ISI 
model, the government endorsed a liberalized trading scheme, privatized state-owned companies, 
and sought to decrease its role as economic entrepreneur. In principle, these efforts can be 
understood as a modernization of the Brazilian economy—the same objective as the old 
development state. Yet the path to modernization has clearly changed, with increased global 
exposure acting as the catalyst for Brazilian economic development. Seemingly in contrast with 
the short-termed priorities of monetary and fiscal policy, the FHC government adopted a long-
term development strategy with major immediate repercussions.  
In general, trade policy during the Cardoso years followed the principle of liberalization 
initiated by the Collor administration. Most major trade barriers, both tariff and non-tariff, were 
removed during the first half of the 90s. By 1994, average tariff levels rested at 14.2%, less than 
half of the nominal average at the start of 1990 (Baumann, 2001). Though the FHC government 
generally maintained a liberal trade policy, the over-valued real and a reduction in domestic 
producer protections led to a greater demand for imports and a decrease in exports, creating an 
increasingly worrisome trade deficit. In response to this, the government intervened in key 
 sectors, such as the automobile industry, protecting favored industries from competition. This 
raised the overall tariff rate by 3% (Baumann and Franco, 2006). The willingness of the 
government to intervene in this way suggests that, rather than a commitment to “free trade”, the 
FHC administration demonstrated its priority for export competitiveness. The threshold for 
negative short-term results highlights the relative pragmatism of the government’s long-term 
strategy. 
State ownership and monopolies, a cornerstone of the old developmental state, also 
underwent continued dismantling during the Cardoso period. Again, continuing with the process 
started under the Collor government, the retraction of state controlled production continued 
under the auspices of reducing government debt and increasing productive efficiency. Because 
national control of industries was protected by the 1988 constitution, privatizing national 
industries and public utilities and breaking up monopolies required a constitutional amendment. 
Embedded in the broader efforts to reinstitute economic order, these legislative measures broke 
up state monopolies on telecommunications, subsoil resources, electricity, coastal shipping, and 
gas distribution. Petrobrás, the enormous and iconic national oil company, lost its monopoly on 
petroleum exploration and production.20 Reflecting the greater value placed on productivity, the 
removal of barriers to previously state-controlled industries served to create a more inviting 
atmosphere for foreign capital and ownership. 
In addition to dismantling state monopolies, the FHC government also furthered the 
retraction of state ownership. Although the restructuring of ownership was extensive and 
affected major sectors of the Brazilian economy, the state often maintained partial, or even a 
majority stake in companies. Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003) divide the privatization process into three 
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 parts: first, the federal National Program of ‘Destatization” (NPD), begun in 1991, focused on 
major national industries, such as Embraer and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce; the second, which 
primarily included state level privatizations, focused on utility providers; and the third, occurring 
during the Cardoso years, concentrated on the telecommunications sector. From 1990 to 2000, 
the number of State Owned Enterprises (SOE) dropped from 186 to 102. The proceedings from 
this privatization process provided the federal government with an extra $87 billion in revenue, 
plus an additional $18 billion in debt transfers. Between 1997 and 1998, the peak years of the so 
named “telecom program”, receipts from the sale of SOEs accounted for 67 percent of the total 
value of the privatization process up to 2001. Yet, although the structure of ownership changed, 
the state most certainly did not abandon its activity in the economy entirely. 
Rather than a wholesale retreat from its entrepreneurial role, the program of privatization 
and the removal of state monopolies can be seen as an increase in the partnership between 
government and the private sector. Many companies were not sold outright; rather, portions of 
the firms were made public, with the state maintaining a minority or even controlling stake. 
Rabelo and Vasconcelos (2002) describe the differing characteristics of the privatization process 
as it occurred in various sectors. While the petrochemical industry generally came under the 
increased influence of national groups, privatization in the steel sector, and especially the 
telecom sector, brought an increasing amount of foreign investment into the structure of 
ownership. In a study on leading companies in Brazil, Rocha and Kupfer (2002) note that, during 
the period 1991-1999, the market share of SOEs fell from 44.6 per cent to 24.3 per cent, that of 
multinational enterprises rose from 14.8 per cent to 36.4 percent, with private national 
enterprises maintaining their share of market sales. Thus, the structure of ownership in Brazil, 
while not fully privatized, became much more internationalized, especially in the telecom and 
 energy sectors (Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002). However, it should also be noted that public 
utility companies were transferred to the private sector in the form of temporary concessions, 
with a reevaluation at the end of the designated period (Amann and Baer, 2009). This further 
suggests that, rather than assuming a hands-off approach, the state abandoned direct productive 
control embracing instead a more regulatory and managerial role in economic affairs. 
The process of economic restructuring also entailed a smaller role for government in 
investment. With efforts toward fiscal austerity pivotal to the government’s primary objective, it 
comes as no surprise that state investment in infrastructure and economic development continued 
to decline through the 90s. According to the World Bank (2007), public investment in 
infrastructure fell from an average of 5.22 per cent of GDP during 1981 to 1985, to 2.35 per cent 
of GDP in 1996 to 2000. At the same time, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) increased 
substantially. Data from the Brazilian Central Bank reveals that gross FDI increased from $2 
billion in 1994 to $16.7 billion in 2002, with the year 2000 showing the most highest level at 
$32.8 billion. Despite the fact that a great portion of this influx in FDI can be attributed to the 
privatization program, the trend of increased private investment, both portfolio21 and FDI, and 
the decreases in government investment suggest a new reliance on private capital, and especially 
foreign capital, to drive Brazilian investments. 
The focus on price stability brought little growth, accompanied by a negative trend in 
employment. Following IBGE data, the Brazilian economy during Cardoso period was 
characterized by an average growth rate of 2.3%, with zero growth in 1998. A comparison of 
growth during the 90s with that of the preceding “lost decade” reveals an even more startling 
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 statistic: while the 80s produced an average of 3.03% growth per annum, the reform dominated 
90s delivered a mere 1.82% growth average. Coinciding with the dismal growth record, open 
unemployment rose from 5.1 per cent in 1994 to 7.6 per cent in 1999. Yet, citing a study by the 
DIEESE, Amann and Baer (2002) signal to the inaccuracy of official figures, due to “disguised 
unemployment”, and assert that total unemployment in 2000 was 16.2% of the labor force. In 
general, these same authors attribute increased unemployment to the shedding of “excess labor” 
brought on by the privatization process, as well as increases realized in productive technology 
resultant from increased trade openness. Along with this came a rise in the informal sector, parts 
of which later became reintegrated into the formal work sector through a change in tax laws 
(Macedo, 2003)22. Given the dismal growth of the economy, and especially of employment—due 
in great part to the preference for capital-intensive productivity gains—an even greater need to 
strengthen the social welfare system arose. 
Social Policies-FHC 
 In the past, efforts to raise and protect the social well-being concentrated in the formal 
channels of representation, especially social security and medical benefits. The 1988 constitution 
endorsed social inclusion as a basic right of citizens and furthermore lent its decentralized bias to 
the social service provisions it engendered. Given the longstanding inequality in Brazil, the 
increase in informal employment, the culture of clientelistic practices, and the influence of 
arguments for more efficient governance, new strategies to alleviate poverty and raise the 
standard of living became necessary. Traditional systems of social protection were becoming too 
costly, as with social security, and some of the newly expanded and constitutionally mandated 
services, such as those addressing education and health, received too little funding. In response 
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 to the growing need of society and the inefficacy of the old system, reforms and new welfare 
institutions emerged during the FHC government, contributing to the further evolution of the 
Brazilian government’s role in societal development and well-being. 
Income transfers proved fundamental to the FHC social development strategy. Central to 
the government’s reformist efforts, reconstructing the national pension system constituted a 
major objective in the broader context of redistribution. Brazil’s national pension system began 
to show signs of trouble in the late 80s, with the slowdown of job creation and the inclusion of 
rural workers in the social security system. Add to this increases in life expectancy, the 
demographic shift to an aging society, and the effects of the real plan on the real value of 
benefits and what emerges is a fiscal imbalance. Furthermore, the government passed a new 
minimum wage in 1996 and, given that a large portion of benefits are tied to the minimum wage, 
this contributed to the rising costs of the pension system. By 1998, social security expenditures 
reached 10 per cent of GDP, being disbursed to nearly 19 million real beneficiaries and 
producing a deficit equal to 3 percent of GDP (Baumann, 2001). Between the three components 
of the national pension system23, public sector employees received 75 percent of the benefits 
paid out, though they represented a significantly smaller number of actual beneficiaries.  
A partial reform of the pension system was carried out in 1998. As the deficit of the 
system coincided with the government’s larger agenda, this reform focused primarily on 
reducing expenditures (Fleischer, 1998). This it accomplished through installing a cap on 
monthly benefits (with special treatment for the public sector), supplanting qualification by 
minimum time of contribution for one according to minimum time of service, eliminating early 
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 retirement benefits and incentives, and making room for the introduction of a new benefit 
calculus that removed incentives for income under-reporting (Giambiagi and Ronci, 2005). 
However, many of the most egregious elements of the civil servant social security system 
remained unchallenged, likely due to the fact that the legislators themselves were beneficiaries of 
systemic biases.  
Alongside the efforts to balance pension expenditures and contributions, the FHC 
government created new social welfare institutions, with the object of raising the basic standard 
of living. As the efforts at fiscal restraints provided an obstacle for large increases in social 
investment and welfare spending, the FHC government sought to improve public social services 
through increased institutional efficiency (Faria, 2002). To this end, the administration adopted 
some fifty programs. Amongst these, income transfer programs, such as Bolsa Escola, Bolsa 
Alimentação, The Rural Worker’s Pension, and the Disabilities Benefit program proved 
enormously successful. By 2002, income transfers reached a total of R$ 27 billion, or about 2.5 
per cent of GDP. Macedo (2003) notes the coincidence of these programs with the IFI supported 
objective of targeted social programs, drawing further attention to the fact that the most 
“successful” programs address the needs of extremely vulnerable populations.  
The increasing role of income transfer programs exhibited two main trends: inclusion of 
exposed and vulnerable populations, and the use of income transfers as incentives. The Rural 
Worker’s pension and the Disabilities Benefit exemplify the further realization of the inclusion 
model enshrined in the 1988 constitution and the gradual evolution of Brazil’s social welfare 
system toward universality. Reaching 6,370, 547 workers and costing R$ 15.5 billion, the Rural 
Worker’s pension, which accounted for 33.2 per cent of total income transfers in 2001, reflects 
the steady expansion of social protection throughout the 90s, despite efforts at austerity (Bonturi, 
 2002). The social security system also expanded to include benefits for disabled and elderly 
people, irregardless of past contributions. Initiated in 1996, this program came to benefit 2.2 
million people in 2002.  
Within the evolving social protection system, the increased use of Conditional Cash 
Transfer (CCT) registers as particularly noteworthy. Coinciding with the advice of international 
agencies, such the World Bank, the IMF, and UNICEF, many of the Cardoso administrations 
most widely praised social programs reflected the targeting, empowering, and co-responsibility 
priorities of the “New Social Policy”24. Bolsa Escola, Auxilílio Gás, and Cartão Alimentação are 
all programs operating off the same basic principle: in exchange for immediate aid, beneficiaries 
must participate in longer term strategies for poverty relief, such as ensuring school attendance, 
receiving vaccinations, or attending informational workshops on nutrition. Draibe (2005) notes 
that this expanding and CCT-led strategy for poverty relief became further supported with the 
creation of the Poverty Fund, in 2000, a law pushed through by the PT.  
Educational spending received a notable level attention during the FHC years. Aside 
from the attendance increasing effects of the Bolsa Escola scholarship program, the FHC 
government also attempted to ameliorate school funding issues through the creation of FUNDEF. 
The 1988 constitution mandated minimum portions of budgets at all levels of government to be 
set aside for financing education. However, the budget crises plaguing many sub-national 
governments produced spending shortfalls in this crucial area, especially in poorer regions of the 
country (Afonso and Mello, 2000). In 1998, the federal government responded by creating 
FUNDEF, a fund to ensure the minimum amount of spending per child in school. The fund was 
created as a temporary constitutional amendment, needing re-approval in 2006. In addition to 
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 earmarking 15 percent of total revenue transfers and ICMS collection for financing basic 
education, this program also set aside resources to enhance the qualifications of teachers. 
As with other social provisions, the 1988 constitution expanded health services by 
establishing access as a universal entitlement, coordinated by a single public entity: the 
Integrated Health System (SUS). Efforts to finance health services encountered similar 
challenges as other social programs in the 90s. The government took measures to reinforce the 
financial base of health services in 1996, with the creation of a new, specific tax, and again in 
2000, through a constitutional amendment that mandated a 17 percent of income minimum 
expenditure level for sub-national governments (Draibe, 2005). In addition to this, the Family 
Health Program (PSF) was created in 1998. This program sought to improve distribution of 
health services by decentralizing services. In lieu of urban-centered medical facilities, teams of 
health service professionals were created to engage on the community level, bringing greater 
access to rural areas25. Efforts to decrease the price of pharmaceuticals also benefited national 
healthcare services. Citing Almeida (2002), Macedo (2003) notes the dramatic increase in 
generic, less expensive drugs, from an estimated 4.6 million boxes in 2000, to approximately 
71.5 million in 2002.  
In general, governance during the Cardoso presidency resulted in gains for most social 
indicators. The number of people living in impoverished circumstances dropped considerably, 
from 41.7 percent in 1993, to 34 percent in 200226. However, as no significant changes occurred 
between 1995 and 2002, the majority of this reduction in poverty can be seen as a positive effect 
of the price stability realized by the real plan. Inequality, as measured by the Gini index, stayed 
relatively the same—a surprising outcome given the increase in unemployment from 6.1 percent 
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 in 1995, to 9.4 percent in 2001. At the same time, enrollment in primary school continued to 
increase, infant mortality and illiteracy rates continued to decline, health services expanded to 
cover more people, and access to basic utilities increased27. All of this information indicates that, 
while state reforms do appear to have produced negative effects in areas such as labor and 
income, the gradually increasing role of government in providing social services seems to have 
had positive effects in increases in the overall standard of living. 
Lula-A Radical’s Agenda 
Brazil, like many of its South American neighbors, responded to the failure of the 
Washington Consensus by voting the left into power. As the 1990s came to a close, it became 
clear to many that the privatizations, austerity measures, and retraction of state influence taking 
place as part of a neoliberal reform agenda had, at best, limited success. Lula, the Worker Party’s 
(PT) perennial candidate, represented a shift in policy-making toward more socially oriented 
governance. Even though the PT had opposed neoliberal reforms in the 90s, party leaders 
recognized the necessity of support from the Brazilian business community and from investors 
abroad, leading it to adopt a pragmatic perspective on economic policy. 
 In 2003, when Lula’s electoral victory became imminent, the potential threat of Brazil’s 
socialist party gaining power led international investors to bet against Brazil, negatively affecting 
the country’s foreign reserves, inflation rate, currency value, and interest rates. Falling in line 
with the recommendations of the IMF, President Lula promised to respect the principles of 
market stability and openness embodied in the reforms of the preceding decade and ameliorated 
this tension. Thus the priority for short-term stability established a place of primacy in the 
government’s agenda due to the pressure of the international financial community. Lula’s 
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 mandate then was two-fold: maintain conditions favorable for foreign investment and improve 
the social well being of the nation. 
 The Lula administration’s policy agenda clearly reflected the double mandate that 
brought it to power. While the new government acknowledged its dependency on global 
investment and competitiveness to drive national development and economic growth, this 
appeared to coincide with a return to the federal government taking a more decisive role to make 
economic growth produce more socially tenable results. In the Plano Plurianual de Ação (PPA) 
2004-2007, the administration clearly articulated its development goals and strategies. The 
government declared its meta objectives as: 1) social inclusion and the reduction of social 
inequality, 2) economic growth generating job creation, income growth, environmental 
sustainability, and the reduction of inequality, and 3) the promotion and expansion of citizenry 
and the strengthening of democracy (PPA, 2004). In essence, the government proclaimed that it 
would cure the poor growth, unemployment, and socially polarizing effects of the previous two 
decades, ushering in a new model of development for Brazil. 
 With macroeconomic policy locked into place at the behest of international financiers, 
the administration moved to distinguish its development strategy from those of former 
governments by consolidating and expanding social welfare programs. While these effort had the 
clear intention of alleviating the widespread immiseration of poverty, and in particular, hunger, 
the government also noted the eradication of poverty as fundamental block in its economic 
development strategy. To this end, the PPA predicts that increases in mass consumption would 
bolster its efforts to spur economic growth. In summation, the Lula administration identified 
social development as the core dimension of its development strategy. 
Macroeconomic Management-Lula 
 As previously mentioned, Lula’s ascendancy to the executive office initially troubled 
foreign investors. Worries that the PT government would alter or abandon the investment-
friendly macroeconomic model of the Cardoso administration led to a speculative attack, which 
necessitated an IMF intervention. From the negotiations surrounding this event emerged an 
agreement that Brazil’s forthcoming president, whomever that should be, would continue to 
follow the economic management scheme of the departing administration. Hence, at least in the 
area of monetary policymaking, the Lula administration’s options were clearly limited. 
With stability preordained as a requisite concern for the new government, monetary 
policy continued its conservative path. 1999’s monumental currency devaluation marked a 
change in exchange rate policy, but the central bank continued to target inflation levels through 
the manipulation of domestic interest rates, thus bringing about a revaluation of the real. 
Barbosa-Filho (2008) notes that authorities remained committed to this tactic, continuing to 
adjust interest rates up or down, depending on the circumstances. With domestic inflation and 
uncertainty in the international capital markets contextualizing the political transition, Lula’s first 
year in office was marked by an increase in base interest rates, from 18 % in September 2002, to 
26.5% in February 2003. Over the course of Lula’s first term in office, this strategy produced an 
average real base interest rate of 11.3%, even higher than that of the preceding administration. In 
addition to this, the real experienced an increase in its exchange value relative to the dollar, 
though this did not bring negative effects to Brazil’s trade account.28 The central bank’s strategy 
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 experienced great success with respect to controlling inflation29, accompanied by a staggered, yet 
steady, reduction in real interest rates. 
Fiscal policy during the first Lula administration followed a mostly conservative path. An 
increase to the primary budget surplus target, from 3.5% of GDP to 4.25%, marked Lula’s first 
year in office. This conservative move brought the predictable result of putting pressure on 
government expenditures, especially in the area of social services and public investment. While 
this fiscal crunch can be seen as a direct result of the higher cost of servicing debt, a bi-product 
of monetary policy, it did not last long. Increased revenues  made possible both the higher 
budgetary surplus and increased spending in favor of the poverty relief agenda of the PT.  
Increases in the primary budget surplus served to lower the debt to GDP ratio to a level 
favorable to international creditors, namely, under 50%. This controversial strategy ostensibly 
places priority on the long term objective of a reduced debt burden, while creating an immediate 
impact on the government’s short term budgeting options. In practice, over the course of Lula’s 
two presidencies, total debt has indeed dropped, from 60.5% of GDP at the beginning of 2003 to 
41.7% by July of 2010 (IPEA, 2010).30 The reduction in debt levels eventually made more fiscal 
space for some of the government’s spending priorities, as well as slight reduction in the budget 
surplus target. Some analysts have further critiqued the priority placed on debt servicing as a 
move to conform to the desires of investors, which eventually brought the desired result of an 
improved credit rating (Pereira, 2009). This higher investment grade brought a further increase in 
the role of international capital in Brazil, to such an extent that the government reinstituted a tax 
on capital entering and leaving the country, hoping to deter those seeking only a quick return. 
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 Tax reform constituted a major objective of the first Lula presidency and further aided the 
effort to increase spending while remaining within the increased budgetary constrictions. 
Occurring within the context of the historical struggle between the central government and sub-
national governments over revenue sharing, the Lula administration met with governors and 
other sub-national politicians to form a proposal for tax reform that would reflect the interests of 
all levels of government. After rounds of negotiations and political concessions, government 
officials emerged with a bill containing far less of the bold tax system consolidation measures 
than originally proposed. It was, however, recognized as containing one major innovation: the 
PIS-Cofins, two taxes contributing to fund Social Security and social inclusion programs, 
became non-cumulative31. Though the change was thought to have a negligible effect on 
revenue, Barbosa-Filho (2008) notes that, along with increased revenues due to higher growth 
rates, the new, non-cumulative character of these important taxes realized a 0.5 % of GDP 
increase in the total contributions. Thus, while the monetary climate placed constraints on fiscal 
policy, the Lula government managed to increase social spending through an increase in taxes. 
Later, in Lula’s second term, a new focus on economic growth led the government to initiate tax 
cuts, mostly through investment incentives.  
The second Lula administration brought a clear shift to fiscal policy making. Loureiro, 
Gomide, and Santos (2009) argue that the administrative and staff changes brought on by the 
2005 corruption scandal marked a turn in priorities toward growth32. With Brazil continuing to 
show relatively disappointing growth figures, it became clear that fiscal austerity as a long-term 
debt reduction strategy posed an obstacle to economic development. With this realization came a 
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 revitalization of the government’s role as a an investor in the economy. Although the 
conservative policy making of the Central Bank continued, albeit increasingly more favorable to 
investment given international conditions33, the central government actively engaged itself in 
increasing investment, in order to “unthaw” the economy. The National Economic and Social 
Development Bank (BNDES) and Caixa Econômica Federal both received increased funding as 
part of the government’s Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), launched in 2007. Realizing that 
economic growth would not alleviate budgeting issues, aid the administration’s social welfare 
priority, and furthermore abate much of the criticism laid against it, the Lula government made 
fomenting growth a new pillar of the macroeconomic strategy. 
Economic Growth and Development-Lula 
Rhetorically, promoting economic growth constitutes a key element of the Lula 
administration’s priorities from the very beginning. Though this objective received some 
attention in the PPA, the priority placed on monetary stability and the reduction of the debt to 
GDP ratio precluded any increase in government investment. In this respect, the second Lula 
administration represents a truer manifestation of the vision offered by the PT in the documents 
defining its objectives34. With the announcement of the PAC, the Brazilian government began to 
behave in a manner more reminiscent of the developmental policies of the past. 
The increased level of fiscal austerity occurring during Lula’s first presidency prevented 
the government from counter-balancing the dearth of investment characterizing Brazil since the 
beginning of State reforms. However, that is not to say that the government did not take 
measures to reinvigorate its role as  a promoter in the economic system. The Lula administration 
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 defined its approach to economic development through the unveiling of its Industrial, 
Technological, and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE), a multi-agency policy agenda. As the title 
suggests, this agenda focuses on improving Brazil’s productive and technological capacity to 
gain an improved and more competitive position in the international marketplace. More 
precisely, this agenda embodies an attempt to assert the state’s role in increasing the systemic 
competitiveness of the Brazilian economy through promoting a National System of Innovation 
(NSI)35. In describing the nature and specific actions taken toward this new objective, Doctor 
(2009) identifies three main policy areas: (i) improving the competitiveness of existing industries 
through modernization; (ii) creating incentives and institutional support in four key sectors: 
software, semi-conductors, capital goods, and pharmaceuticals; and (iii) promoting future-
oriented technologies, such as biotechnology, renewable energy, and nano-technology.  
In contrast to traditional efforts to expand fiscal support of national industries, Brazil’s 
21st century industrial policy first sought to adjust government structure and behavior. New 
agencies emerged to change the process of development policy formation, as well as increase its 
success in implementation. The Council for Economic and Social Development (CDES), which 
provides business leaders and civil society a forum with government officials—including the 
president of the republic—formed in 2003, in hopes to define the Lula administration’s distinct 
approach to policy36. In 2005, the creation of two new institutions, the Brazilian Industrial 
Development Agency (ABDI) and the National Industrial Development Council (CNDI), served 
to directly support the policy objectives set out in the PITCE, and later its successor: the 
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 Production Development Plan (PDP), announced in 2008. While ABDI came to be in order to 
provide better coordination and institutional efficiency, ensuring the provision of means for 
policy ends, the CNDI supplied a direct forum for the private sector to offer its perspective on 
government action in promoting economic development.  
Government efforts to revitalize industrial policy also included numerous legislative 
pieces. The Lei de Inovação, passed in 2004, essentially encouraged greater information and 
technology innovation and sharing by creating R&D partnerships, establishing regulatory 
standards for technology transfers, and supplying common resources and equipment to ensure 
the means of innovation. In addition to this, the Lei do Bem, in 2005, created a variety of fiscal 
and tax incentives to encourage investment in technology; the Informatics Law extended fiscal 
incentives for the use of informatics in R&D; and the Bio-Security Law created regulations for 
research with stem cells and genetically modified organisms. Finally, the government’s 
commitment to promote cooperation as a pivotal element of development resulted in the Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) law, passed in 2004, which served to reassert the government’s 
dedication to working with the private sector on public projects. 
Among other efforts to reactivate the state’s role as promoter of economic development, a 
notable increase in development funding aided the PITCE and PDP objectives. In 2004, a new 
model of industrial fund management brought an increased level of efficiency to the use of 
financial resources located in the National Science and Technology Development Fund 
(FNDCT)37, a subprogram of the Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (FINEP). The increase in 
resources distributed through FNDCT coincided with the more active role taken by FINEP as a 
whole. Likewise, BNDES showed a consistent and significant rise in lending. Disbursement of 
                                                 
37 Total resources increased from R$343 million in 2002, to $800 million in 2005, for example 
(ABDI, 2008). 
 funds expanded from R$ 35.1 billion in 2003, to R$ 137.4 billion in 2009. Reflecting the 
targeting strategy set forth in policy, these loans were made to companies in strategic sectors, 
such pharmaceuticals, computer technology, and especially the energy sector.  
The PAC, initiated in 2007, provided further rationale for state intervention. The fiscal 
austerity measures dominating policy making constraints levels of state investment. The launch 
of the PAC was a direct response to the lack of investment in Brazil, both private and public, 
especially in infrastructure. Over a period of four years, the PAC provided R$ 503.9 billion for 
investment in energy, sanitation, transportation, housing, and water resources. Increasing 
investment in infrastructure had clear implications on improving the overall capacity of the 
Brazilian economy, but was further seen as a means of “unthawing” the economy, breaking 
Brazil out of its mediocre growth. In this respect, PAC seems to have realized some success. The 
Brazilian economy grew by 6.1% in 2007 and 5.1% in 2008, with 2009 exhibiting slightly 
negative growth38; however, with estimations for growth in 2010 at around 7%39, it seems clear 
that the impact was minimal. Moreover, GDP per capita has continued on an impressive and 
steady rise since 2003, jumping from $6,970 a person in 2003, to $8,220 in 2009.  
International factors continued to influence the evolution of Brazilian political economy. 
As in previous years, the role of international investment continued to expand. The Brazilian 
Central Bank (2010) reports that net foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in Brazilian companies 
reached massive levels. While FPI measured $5.1 billion in 2003, this figure reached $48.1 
billion in 2007 and $46 billion in 2009. More importantly, FDI also increased, reaching it’s peak, 
at $45 billion, in 2008. In sum, the value of FDI during the two Lula administrations up to 2009, 
                                                 
38 The drop in growth in 2009 is generally recognized as the result of a global financial crisis, 
originating in the US. Data from the IBGE.  
39 Following reports from O Estado de São Paulo, 9/15/2010.  
 registers as $167.7 billion, $2 billion more than the aggregate value of FDI during the Cardoso 
presidencies.  
Brazil’s performance in the global market place was of pivotal concern. The Lula 
administration’s industrial policy focused intently on the economy’s ability to compete on the 
global level. In point of contrast to the former administration’s strategy, this government sought 
to actively promote export industries, through programs such as the PITCE and the PDP. 
Moreover, Brazil’s past financial instability, resulting from a dependence on foreign capital, 
created a need for ensuring a surplus in the trade account. In Lula’s first year in office, exports 
grew by 21.3%, up from 3.7% growth in 2002. After six years of consistent and significant 
growth, the value of Brazil’s exports reached $197.9 billion. More importantly, this growth 
outpaced the value of imports in every year, bring the total trade surplus over the period 2003-
2009 to $240.4 billion.40 However, the stellar performance of the export sector was largely 
pushed by the world demand for primary goods. While the returned focus on competitiveness 
does coincide with a major turn around in the trade account, the sectors targeted by the new 
industrial policy did not lead this accomplishment. 
Social Policy- Lula 
 Much has been made by the Lula administration’s focus on social policy, and with good 
warrant. Building off of the efforts of the preceding administration, government programs 
designed to fight poverty expanded not only in their reach, but more also in their effect, lifting 
masses of impoverished people to a higher standard of living. At the same time, innovations in 
the economic development model envisioned by the government called for a strengthening of 
mass consumption and recognized the dual impact of public infrastructural projects, tying 
                                                 
40 My calculations according to SECEX/MDIC data.  
 together arguments for social and economic intervention. Yet, as critics are quick to point out, 
key services, such as education and healthcare, continue to suffer a lack of funding. While it is 
clear that the government’s role in promoting social welfare now takes an explicit route, this 
seems to be more the maturation of previous visions, rather than a breakthrough in establishing 
social safety nets. 
The Lula administration pursued its vision of empowerment and inclusion by 
consolidating and expanding CCT programs. In 2003, Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, and 
Auxilio Gás,  were joined by Cartão Alimentação, a new food entitlement scheme using a special 
electronic card, under the umbrella program Fome Zero. Though unified in name, CCT programs 
suffered from a lack of administrative efficiency and overall co-ordination (Hall, 2008). In order 
to alleviate these issues, the government incorporated the CCT sub-programs41 into a single, 
unified scheme, labeled Bolsa Família. To further bolster the efficacy of the new, consolidated 
CCT, the Ministry of Food Security and Fight Against Hunger was merged with the Ministry of 
Social Welfare to form the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (MDS), 
which assumed management of the Bolsa Família program from the President’s office. However, 
while the centralization of management on the federal level is seen as contributing to the 
program’s achievements, Fenwick (2009) argues that the real source of success lies in the 
federal-municipal partnership, as distribution happens on the municipal level. Thus, while Bolsa 
Família receives much praise as a federal program, one must also note the growing role of 
municipalities and the benefits of decentralized distribution of services. 
                                                 
41The Programa de Erradicão do Trabalho Infantil (The Plan to Eradicate Child Labor, or 
PETI), a program initiated in 1996 and utilizing conditional cash transfers as an incentive to 
prevent child labor, was later folded into the Bolsa Família program, in 2006.  
  Promises to mitigate poverty during the Lula administration proved substantive. In terms 
of reach, CCT programs have greatly extended the number of beneficiaries, from 6 million 
families in 2002, to 12.7 million42 by the end of 2009 (MDS, 2010), making Bolsa Família the 
largest CCT program in the world. Moreover, benefits per household have increased as well. 
Between 2003-2005, the average of benefits per household nearly tripled from R$28 to R$75 per 
month (Brazil, 2005). By 2010, this average reached R$95 per month, with the total cost of Bolsa 
Família reaching 0.8% of GDP43. And the expansion of income transfer programs brought 
results. The percentage of people living in poverty, defined as an annual income of less than 
R$121, dropped from 28% in 2003 to 19% by 2006. As well, the infamous inequality plaguing 
Brazil, as measured by the IPEA’s calculation of the Gini coefficient, saw an appreciable 
reduction, from 0.589 in 2002 to 0.543 in 2009.  
 The Lula administration took other actions that altered the welfare system. Most 
prominently, this included the passing of pension reform bill, in 2003, which served to 
compliment the 1998 amendment. As with the preceding reform, this amendment found its 
impetus in the still deteriorating fiscal situation of the national pension system. In contrast to its 
predecessor, the 2003 reform targeted the public sector regime. This included establishing a 
minimum retirement age for civil servants, unifying contribution rates, and placing a cap on 
benefits. And while these measures sought to decrease the growing expenditures of the system, 
changes made to social contributions taxes, the “PIS-Cofins”, led to increased revenues. 
According to Barbosa-Filho (2008), this increased PIS-Cofins contributions by 0.5% of GDP, a 
rise that went directly to increased income transfers. 
                                                 
42 With the an average family size of 4 in Brazil, this means that approximately 50.8 million 
citizens benefit from Bolsa Família. 
43 This is up from 0.2% of GDP in 2003. 
  Intervention in the labor market further characterized the Lula government. Throughout 
Lula’s two terms, the government utilized the ability granted it by the 1988 constitution to 
reassess the minimum wage in Brazil. Given Lula’s personal history with the labor movement 
and his political constituency, it comes as no surprise that his presidency would be marked by 
consistent increases in Brazil’s minimum wage, from R$200 in 2002 to R$ 510 by the start of 
2010. These increases outpaced inflation, bringing real gains to the average worker’s income. 
Baltar, et al (2010) note that annual increases in the minimum wage between 2003 and 2008 
brought a total of 38.3% in real gains to base wages. Furthermore, the government’s growing 
concern with economic growth, and its subsequent promise of increased revenues, may have 
aided in the growth of formal employment, which grew from 25 million in 1999 to 39.4 million 
in 2008 (Baltar, et al., 2010). While government efforts to create a more favorable environment 
for productive investment may or may not have been a factor in this growth, it is clear that the 
increase in public hiring has certainly contributed to increases in secure employment. According 
to the Annual Account of Social Information (RAIS), in the period 2003-2008, civil servants 
increased by 25%, or 1.4 million employees. Much of this coincided with the government’s 
reengagement with promoting growth, through the PAC. 
 The means employed to rekindle growth, through the PAC, coincide with the 
government’s social policy agenda. In the PAC, infrastructural investment is seen not only as a 
route to increase the logistical capacity of the productive sector, but also as an instrument to 
universalize economic benefits. Of the R$503.9 billion set aside for the PAC, R$274.8 billion 
were earmarked for social and urban infrastructure. Projects within this area of investment 
sought to increase access to sanitation networks, create housing and urban transportation, and 
universalize access to electricity. These investments carried clear implications on the 
 government’s vision for social development, which placed inclusion and empowerment at the 
forefront, making access to the benefits of modernity an explicit public goal. With this, the 
government marks an apparent turn in its development strategy: economic growth and social 
welfare become interdependent factors, with the promotion of either producing benefits for the 
other.. 
 One pressing critique of the Lula administration regards its lack of attention on the 
provision and quality of education and health services. With CCT programs assuming a central 
place in the government’s agenda, many argue that badly needed funds were channeled from 
these pivotal services to poverty relief efforts. As a portion of federal spending, education 
decreased from 3.01% of the total budget in 2002, to 2.66% in 2009, with 2006 dedicating only 
2.17% of the budget to education. Likewise, funds allocated to health services decreased from 
5.79% to 4.55% of total federal expenditures. Over the same period of time, expenditure on 
social assistance increased from 1.48% to 3.01% of the budget44. Despite this relative fall in 
spending, some innovations were made in the area of education. 
 Amongst government efforts to advance the quality of public education, the extension of 
federal aid to under-funded school districts and the creation of a new teacher evaluation program 
emerge as noteworthy. Fundef, which established a minimum level of funding per student, 
nation-wide, expired in 2006. However, the program had garnered notable success, making it 
clear candidate for renewal. This occurred in 2007, with the program’s name receiving a minor 
change to Fundeb45, and a new, 2020 expiration date. In addition to this, policy makers created 
incentives for increasing the technical capacity of schools, through the Professionalize Brazil 
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45 This stands for: O Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica e de 
Valorização dos Profissionais da Educação, or the Fund for the Maintenance and Development 
of Basic Education and the Valorization of Educational Professionals. 
 program46, and increasing the partnership between educational professionals and the community, 
through the Formation of the School47 program. While these efforts pale in comparison to the 
attention given to poverty alleviation, they do offer two interesting points of intersection with the 
government’s central objectives in that they: (i) encourage a more technologically capable and 
innovative society and (ii) utilizing private-public partnerships. 
A New, Postmodern Developmental State 
The combined experience of these two administrations defies the paradigmatic labels 
used to describe their character. This study has shown that, while both administrations have 
espoused policies that reflect a neoliberal purview, they have also behaved in ways that disregard 
orthodox recommendations and embraced other, heterodox positions. This suggests that policies 
have not been employed merely on the merit of their ideological underpinnings, as many analysts 
imply, but pragmatically, in reference to a specific goal. In comparing the old developmental 
state with the defining actions of the contemporary, in and after the reform process, we readily 
conclude that, throughout, the government has maintained its traditional motive purpose: 
promoting development. This implies that, rather than relinquishing development to supposedly 
natural forces, the government has actively pursued new methods of intervention to promote 
development, including reforming the modes of intervention themselves. What distinguishes the 
new from the old is not the retraction of government from economic and social affairs, but the 
increased use of orthodox theory in justifying government action. 
Emergent from the period of institutional reform, then, is not the minimalist, free market 
state of ideologues on either side, but one employing a bricolage-like strategy of development 
policies. While the old development state represented a paragon of modernism—demonstrating 
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47 Formação pela Escola 
 its preference for an industrial society; marked by order and a centralized, rationally based 
system of control—the new development state represents the postmodern. Rather than producing 
some very definite and cogent structure of governance, reforms reflected the changing nature of 
national politics and the increasing demands of globalized networks, making them responsive to 
changes in these factors. As policies continue to evolve and adapt to effectively promote the 
development of Brazil’s productive structure relative to other societies, new political 
circumstances have greatly impacted the way in which government has pursued this goal. 
Just as the 1930 political revolution gave birth to the monolithic development state, the 
1985 return of democracy marked the beginning of a more decentralized structure of governance. 
The tension between the central government and subnational politicians has carried enormous 
weight in policy making during both administrations. The drive for fiscal balance, led during the 
FHC government, entailed negotiations and compromise between levels of government. This 
process had as much to with fighting corruption and installing measures for transparency as it did 
with following orthodox economic prescriptions. It is precisely because these measures found 
multiple impetuses that they passed the test of an increasingly democratic political process and 
came to be. Likewise, the Lula administration acknowledged the necessity of negotiating with 
subnational politicians during the 2003 tax reform. While each administration engaged in this 
process for its own issues, the fact that power sharing between levels of government has become 
a vital factor in Brazil highlights an important point regarding the character of government in the 
postmodern period: in order to be effective, the state must reach consensus. 
Other new, common political dynamics surge forth as important in defining the structure 
of government and determining its role in development. Throughout the time span under 
question, poverty alleviation emerges as a consistent and growing priority. The success of these 
 efforts has given rise to a major development in the structure of political support. Cardoso was 
first elected on the merits of the real plan, which raised real incomes for the poor, and Lula’s 
political success rides on the back of the government’s expanding income transfer programs. 
Raising the standard of living is not only a moral duty, it is a political obligation. Impoverished 
sectors of society constitute a mass of voters that cannot be ignored. Consequently, the vision for 
development must benefit them. International agents now also greatly affect the course of 
policymaking. No were is this more evident than in the havoc created by international investors 
in 2002, but both the Cardoso and Lula administrations consistently worked to attract 
international financiers. The greater the links from the outside world, the more international 
agents will hold the capacity to exert influence over the political process. 
The formulation of macroeconomic policy reflects the perceived need of foreign capital 
in Brazil, not the pursuit of a free market. The debt crisis of the 1980s created an unavoidable 
obstacle to government. The crisis arose from a dependency on foreign capital and the only way 
to ameliorate the prevailing instability was to attract more foreign capital, in order to repay debts. 
Starting with the real plan, monetary policy exhibited a level of government intervention and 
control that rivals the pinnacle of protectionist trade policies under ISI. Manipulation of the 
currency exchange value and interest rates was maintained to attract international capital, toward 
the end of creating the conditions seen as necessary for resumed development and growth. While 
it is true that theories compete to explain how development best occurs, government intervention 
remains the means to correct failures. This tendency has remained in the case of both market and 
government failures. In the area of macroeconomic policy, the side effects  of the emphasis on 
short term stability soon clashed with other objectives, bring to bear the fact that macroeconomic 
policy is not the only variable in development. Economic stability has proven to be an important 
 step, but the evolution of policy making over this period reveals that the produced by Brazil’s 
monetary regime require effective and strategic forms of intervention in the productive and 
social structures. 
Though the economic development strategies pursued under the FHC and Lula 
administrations differ in action, they share a fundamental objective: the insertion of the Brazilian 
economy in the global market. For better or for worse, trade with other countries has been 
embraced as a means to Brazil’s economic development. In practice, this has taken diverse 
forms, first appearing in the drastic reduction of trade barriers and the increased role of foreign 
ownership, and later embodied in the active promotion of export competitiveness. In all cases, 
the government has acted to remedy failures in productivity, through international exposure; in 
competitiveness, through providing financial incentives to export; and in the lack of investment, 
through programs designed to expand the supply of credit and increase the country’s productive 
capacity through  infrastructural projects.  
State ownership in the economy has given way to public-private partnerships, with the 
government’s role being instrumental, but not independent. This makes it difficult to ascertain 
whether the opening of the economy and state privatizations where the result of ideological 
influence, or a necessary step in reforming the mode of state intervention to one based more on 
cooperation than imposition. While the prevalence of neoliberal ideology should be 
acknowledged as a factor, one must also note that authoritarianism accompanied Brazil’s 
expansive and monolithic development state, so the democratization of Brazilian governance 
puts limits on state autonomy. The introduction of civil society into the political framework 
necessitated a complimentary cooperative relationship in economic development. Furthermore, 
in the context of Brazil’s longstanding poverty and inequality, political pressure, along with the 
 rights enshrined in the 1988 constitution, demanded that part of the ensuing development 
strategy involve actions to increase the base standard of living. 
Continuity also characterizes social policy objectives throughout the two administrations. 
Poverty alleviation and social security reform each played a major role in the agendas of both 
governments. While social security reform  played into the austerity measures taken by both 
governments, it also sought to prevent abuses of the pension system, reflecting the calls by both 
for increased transparency and reduced corruption. Moreover, the most widely lauded aspect of 
the Lula government—establishing and strengthening a base level of income through 
government coordinated transfers and increases in the minimum wage—worked off of the many 
innovations made during the Cardoso administrations. In this respect, the actions of the two 
governments may be seen as working hand in hand. While targeting the poorest in society may 
be seen as a palliative for the detrimental effects of neoliberal policy-making, this assertion 
seems to ignore the chronic issue of poverty in Brazil, and the unequal share of wealth produced 
under the former development model. In this area, the policies of this period have produced 
unprecedented results.  In contrast with the traditional role of government, social policy in the 
contemporary period has actively sought to include more citizens in formal society in the short 
term. This indicates that, rather than deserting its role in promoting societal development, the 
government has become more active in this respect. 
Dual meaning of action and apparent contradictions appear throughout the new, emergent 
development model. This suggests that, rather than moving toward a single model of 
development, produced by a single vision, development strategies in Brazil form through a 
pluralistic process. The new development model is one without a singular truth; instead it makes 
use of a variety of theoretical paradigms to accomplish what is for now,  a number of common 
 objectives: (i) a globally competitive productive structure, (ii) a macroeconomic environment 
that attracts foreign capital, and (iii) a more equitable distribution of wealth. In identifying the 
character of postmodern development, we assert that analyses of government policies during the 
period under question should resist over asserting the influence of ideology in policy making. In 
Brazil’s case, the effects of radical changes in the national political structure explain many of the 
new approaches adopted, and the new role assumed by the government in its promotion of 
development.
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